Cultural Imperialism and the Post-Independence First Attempt to Localise the Accountancy Education, Practices and the Profession in Jamaica

 (1950s–1970s)

 

 

 

 

 

 

By

 

 

 

 

 

Owolabi M Bakre

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lecturer in Accounting & Finance

 

 

 

 

 

 

Department of Management Studies

University of the West Indies,

 Mona, Kingston 7, Jamaica

 West Indies

 

 

 

 

Abstract

 

This paper adopts the theoretical framework of ‘cultural imperialism’ to critically examine the post-independence aspiration of Jamaican government and accountants, in forming themselves into an independent professional body, devoid of any foreign influence. This was by forming the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ), which was expected to be capable of examining and credentialing future Jamaican accountants. However, while the professional body was formerly established in 1965, the paramount issues of Jamaican professional examinations and credentialing of prospective Jamaican accountants, continue to be a dream that remains to be actualised. The obstacles to the actualisation were due to the conflicting identities of the two elite groups of ‘global’ and ‘local’ capitalists that emerged in the profession after the independence, and more importantly, the negotiating influence of the self identified parent body, the UK-based ACCA. On the basis of the available evidence, the paper concludes that the ability of the ICAJ to achieve independence from the UK-based ACCA, without a legislative backing from the Jamaican government, is constrained.

 

 

 

KEYWORDS: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica, The UK-based Association of Certified Chartered Accountants, Cultural Imperialism, Localization, Internationalisation, Professionalization, Conflict of Identity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

        In Jamaican colonial era, the practice of accountancy as a profession was firmly under the control of some foreign professional bodies in which those from the UK were dominant Salmon (1998). The consequence of this development in colonial Jamaica was that the non-white majority in the country had been denied the opportunity of becoming qualified accountants, let alone to practise as chartered accountants in their own country (Rattray, 1963). The existing colonial accounting firms refused to article non-white Jamaicans, and advised them that the policies of their parent bodies in England required that they travel to England to get articled in order to become qualified accountants (Rattray, 1963). Paradoxically, the same parent bodies in England consistently refused to article non-white students all over the world on the racial excuse that such students would not be acceptable to their London clients (Smith, 1962).

       As for the Jamaicans, the attitude of the colonial government made the matter worse, as it refused to employ even the few non-white Jamaicans who were able to cross the hurdle and became qualified accountants (Nunes, 1962). In order to address this issue, at independence, it was the aspiration of the new Jamaican government and the Jamaican accountants to bring about radical changes in the island’s accounting profession. As a result, the new independent government of Jamaica and the Jamaican accountants sought to put in place a new Jamaican accounting professional body to replace all forms of colonial bodies operating in the island. It was further felt that the proposed Jamaican body should set its own professional examinations and credential prospective Jamaican accountants.

        In order to achieve this national objective, it was decided to enact a national accountancy law. The proposed national accountancy law was to incorporate a clause, which would guarantee the conduct of local examinations and also protect the interest of the Jamaican accountants against any external encroachments.  While these two objectives were the main issues that led to the enactment of the national accountancy law of 1968, paradoxically, the finally enacted national accountancy law became silent on these paramount issues. Instead, the clause contained in the enacted national accountancy law of 1968, now effectively empowered the ICAJ, if it deems fit, to seek external examinations and credentialing of prospective Jamaican accountants (see the Public Accountancy Law, 1968).

        However, as the main purpose of the national accountancy law had been defeated, the majority accountants in Jamaica had no choice than to again, identify the ACCA out of many foreign professional bodies in the island to see them through to independence in the profession. This was against the spirit behind the enactment of the national accountancy law (see Minute Number 35, from Committee of Proposed Accountancy Law, to the Honourable Minister, Ministry of Trade and Industry, February 5, 1963). At the initial stage of the negotiation between the ICAJ and the ACCA, the trusted ACCA had agreed in principle to see the ICAJ through to independence. However, having gained its full control over the institution of the ICAJ, the trusted ACCA had to change its earlier commitments from a ‘caretaker’ of the ICAJ, to the ‘landlord’ of the ICAJ. However, such ACCA’s inconsistency and economic ambition in particular, continue to receive the support of the minority but powerful global capitalist elite members of the ICAJ who support internationalisation particularly under the control of the UK-based ACCA, and the opposition of the majority local capitalist elite members of the ICAJ, who support localization. This ‘controversial clause’ in the finally enacted national accountancy law of 1968, has provided the minority, but powerful global capitalist elite members of the ICAJ, which felt that the ICAJ should continue to adopt the ACCA’s examinations, the legal backing to continue to defend the status quo, as the ICAJ was formed almost 36 years ago.

          The remainder of this paper is divided into 8 interconnected sections. Section 2 examines the framework of cultural imperialism as the ‘lens’ and the ‘map’ to guide the complexities surrounding the investigation. Section 3 examines the consequences of cultural imperialism on the colonized identity and the existence of, and conflict between the two elite groups of ‘local’ and ‘global’ capitalists in the colonized society. Section 4 links the consequences of cultural imperialism on the colonized identity, to the specific case of the existence of, and conflicts between the two elite groups of ‘local’ and ‘global’ capitalists in the colonized Jamaican society. Section 5 links the conflicts between the two elite groups of ‘local’ and ‘global’ capitalists in the colonized Jamaican society, to the specific case of the existence of, and conflicts between the ‘certified’ and ‘chartered’ elite groups competing for the control of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ). Section 6 adopts the frameworks of cultural imperialism as a tool to examine the professionalization project and the subsequent formation of the ICAJ. In the context of the above professionalization project, Section 7 examines how the Public Accountancy Law, which was enacted to protect the interest of the Jamaican Accountants, paradoxically, became the same Law that empowered the ICAJ to seek for a foreign parent body against its main objective. This section illuminates how the search for a foreign parent body became a negotiating influence of the UK-based Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) and the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants (ACCA); those institutes ICAJ had sought to avoid their influences in its professional development. Section 8 again, utilizes the above frameworks to examine how the ACCA has emerged as the parent body of the ICAJ, in its keen competition with its UK rival, ICAEW. The section further examines how the identification of the trusted ACCA later becomes an impediment to the independent ambition of the ICAJ. Section 9 reviews the paper in the form of summary and discussion.

 

Understanding Cultural Imperialism

       Cultural imperialism is a critical discourse, which operates by representing the culture whose autonomy it defends in its own dominant colonial cultural terms (Said, 1993). It is the extensive and strategic use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a Western culture at the expense of a native (original) culture (Tomlinson, 1999). As Cox (1964) puts it:

Cultural imperialism rests ultimately on the specific colonialist and capitalist use of superior power among developing peoples. It is here that the colonialist and capitalist use of the persons and property of others, in the interest of domestic enterprise may be observed in its purest form; that is, the “distinctive parasitic” relations of capitalist groups to developing peoples. (p. 95)

 

           During colonization, the occupying imperialist introduces the use of its language in its colonies in many important sectors like education, administration and environment. The extent of linguistic colonization can go from a marginal use to a total use of the occupier language in those three sectors of the colonized societies. With the wide diffusion of the colonizer’s language, the scene was set for an extensive spread of other cultural symbols among the people under occupation.[1]

         In order for imperialism to be respected by the colonized, the colonizers frequently tried to convey the impression that its own culture represented the ultimate culmination of a stream of human progress (Beckford, 1972). Consequently, to be socialized into the acceptance of beliefs proclaiming their own inferiority and insignificance, the colonized had first of all to experience waves of indoctrination. Such indoctrination promotes hero-images of Euro-American cultures, while at the same time establishing non-Western cultures as the polar opposites of all that was good, desirable and useful (Biersteker, 1981). As Lindsay (1981) asserts:

In all of this, it is clear that the inferiority complexes generated among non-western peoples from the use of “condensation symbol”[2] are part and parcel of the same processes, which produced the superiority complexes of metropolitan rulers and citizens. (p.19)

 

Thus, cultural imperialism was in part a rationalization of domination of other peoples, often based on the perceived inferiority of the colonized “race” (Lindsay, 1981).

         The ideology depicted the colonizer’s role as that of a father caring for his children, and further emphasized that the survival of the child was very much dependent on the child’s association and reliance on the father (Jackman, 1994). This paternalism not only explained the colonizer’s dominance, but also guaranteed assistance to all the Empire’s subjects. As Fryer (1988), quoting from the book Black Jamaica written by an Englishman, reports:

(The) black man . . . on the eve of emancipation, was a child, ignorant, helpless, irresponsible. His mind was dark and stagnant, moving, if at all, to the blind impulses of superstition and fear, the advancement of the Negro is contingent on his association with the white race . . . Without the stimulus of this factor he cannot better himself. (p.6)

Thus, paternalism was clearly a major factor in imperial ideology (Jackman, 1994). Within this framework, the domination of the colonized could be justified, through its analogy to the pedagogical and necessarily inequitable nature of the father-child relationship (Jackman, 1994).

          However, the most efficient method of ensuring obedient subordinates was through the latter’s consent, their acceptance of the moral authority and legitimacy of the very institutions that oppressed them (Lindsay, 1981). As a result, paternalism was premised on the unquestioning acceptance by the colonized of the unequal relationship. Consequently, the colonized came to believe that the socio-political, economic and cultural attributes associated with people of European descent were inherently more valuable than those linked with those of their original descent (Anderson, 1998). The internalisation of the white supremacist mythology led to an appropriation of the colonizer's ideology as that of the colonized (Anil, 1968). The original history of the colonized was internalised (Anderson, 1998), and the intellectual, cultural and social inferiority of the colonized generally accepted (Jackson, 1985).

          As a consequence, colonialism has succeeded in producing two major opposing elite groups of conflicting identities in every colonized society. The first elite groups are those whose lifestyle continued to be dictated by their colonial past and, therefore, prefer to continue to defend the status quo, and would do anything possible to sustain their position within a given society, association, or occupation. This elite group mediates between their people and the principal capitalist institutions, the colonial power bloc, and other foreign global capitalist group. This elite group was of the view that the societal culture ought to be shaped by the assimilation of the colonial, and other developed Western capitalist, culture, and the identity ought to be a product of various negotiations. As Hall and Du Gay (1996) put it:

The group is of the opinion that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time . . . are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect. (p.57)

 

The second elite group is the opposing group in the society, association or occupation, with the further view that there was a need to find a new compromise. Such a compromise would not sacrifice the local culture, but would give the society a new identity in changing times. As Ozal (1992) puts it:

This group is of the view that the days of imposing one’s own elitist values on the masses are over. Values, which have been borrowed in a wholesale manner in the guise of universalism and expressed in a foreign or at best in hybrid idiom . . . In no way does this approach, deny the universal features of culture. It only emphasises that no people can be creative unless it draws its strength mainly from its own cultural heritage through an intensive updating and upgrading of effort. (p.310)

Thus, within a given society, association, or occupation, elite factions do exist, there are conflicts of policy, individual ambitions do clash (Mills, 1956). 

        However, within this conflict, if an external party pursuing its own global economic interest became a mediator between the groups in cultural conflict, the ingredients were available for the external party to manipulate social categories and material resources of the entire society (Alleyne, 1988). This could give the mediator the opportunity to keep the entire population economically and culturally subordinate to, and dependent upon, its own cultural institution (Nettleford, 1978).

 

 

Linking consequences of cultural imperialism to the Specific Case of the Colonized Jamaican Society

       The system of the British colonial rule in the colonial Jamaican society, characterized by social inequality, exploitation and oppression, had involved selective co-option and careful nurturing of a class ‘who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern (Rodney, 1982). These were a class of persons, Jamaicans in blood and colour but British in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect. This class needed to be educated and ultimately it was being educated to rule and in the process, to also continue to defend the status quo in the neo-colonialist socio-political and economic development in Jamaica (Hadley, 1949). As a result, this class was not only taught to read and write in English, but in the process it was also taught how to think in the best British critical traditions (Norris, 1966). Inevitably, this class discovered the contradictions between that which the great British thinkers had had to say about those fundamentals of the British society and culture: equality, liberty and brotherhood, and the hypothetical, oppressive, racist institutions of the British colonialism under which they were made to suffer (Garvey, 1916). They drew inspirations from the western political writings on democracy, nationhood and socialism (Norris, 1966). As these colonial minded Jamaicans continue to defend the status quo, the peasant from mass majority who are against colonisation and perpetrating of colonial ideas, especially in the post-independence Jamaica have risen to challenge the status quo.

         As a result, as the global capitalist elite tries to build Jamaica into a home away from home for Americans and Europeans, the local capitalist elite would like Jamaica to be a comfortable place for Jamaicans. The global capitalist elite based their view of the world on the premise that Jamaicans are “deficient” and must learn to think, speak, dress, furnish their homes, and have industries like their rich relations and the mother country (Norris, 1966). Anything less is uncivilized, crude, “not decent”, and “not right”. On the contrary, the local capitalist elite’s view is that Jamaica has the capacity for developing a unique and immensely rich civilization of her own (Nettleford, 1989; Stone, 1989). The local capitalist elite is also of the opinion that the global capitalist elite view that Jamaica should strive away from her own potential and towards an imported standard, is often misunderstood and applied out of context. The contribution of a truly Jamaican global capitalist elite to the human experience lies in the culture and in the social mores they have developed through a long history of harsh economic circumstances and social alienation (Norris, 1966). The local capitalist elite, however, believes that such contribution is irrelevant to the developmental requirements of independent Jamaica (Stone, 1989).

         However, the antagonism between these two post-independence elite groups continued to be characterized by conflicts of interest (Gordon, 2000). These conflicts of interest have continued to give opportunity to some foreign global capitalists to penetrate and pursue their own economic interest in Jamaica at the expense of the two elite groups and the general interest of the society at large (Nettleford, 1989).

 

Linking the Conflicts between the Elite Groups of ‘Local’ and ‘Global’ Capitalists in the Colonized Jamaican Society, to the Specific Case of the Struggle between the ‘Certified’ and ‘Chartered’ Elite Groups Competing for the Control of the ICAJ.

        Prior to the formation of the ICAJ in 1965, there was no single body to articulate the views of the profession (Gordon, 2000). Instead, there were three autonomous associations. While there were some Jamaicans who had sat the professional examinations in England, most of the qualified accountants were expatriates from the United Kingdom or North America. The Society of Chartered Accountants represented the latter group. The second body, the Jamaican District Society of the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants, comprised persons who had qualified locally, in some cases, while working under the supervision of a chartered accountant, in circumstances not unlike those of the now defunct legal system of article-ship. The third group, the Association of Accountants of Jamaica Incorporated (AAJI), was affiliated to a small English body. However, the locally qualified practitioners were divided into two major elite groups. The first of these Elite groups was made up of those practitioners who wished to see total independence of the profession in terms of examination and credentialing[3]. The other group was made up of those practitioners who felt not only that the colonial culture should continue to dictate the future direction of the profession in Jamaica, but also that the profession should continue to be under the control of the colonial professional bodies[4]. As Gordon (2000) observes:

Within the ranks of the Association of locally qualified practitioners, was a group known as the ‘Young Turks’. This group militantly opposed the idea of approaching independence, with a profession not only dependent, but divided, and having no local authority to impose discipline. (p.12)

 

When it was proposed to establish the ICAJ, which could unify the opposing groups, conflicts of interest and tension became apparent in meetings and negotiation between the elite groups in the profession. The first president of the ICAJ, William Thwaites, recalled his experience in the first 25 years of the ICAJ, in a talk with John Jackson (Thwaites, 1990):

It was the culmination of about four years of very solid and sometimes acrimonious arguments and discussion between the Association of Certified Accountants and the Society of Chartered Accountants, that is, the two bodies that were represented by members in the island. Needless to say, each one and each person who was in practice, or if not in practice, in business, in Jamaica had very strong ideas about how the thing should be formulated, what the rules should be. The whole gamut of things that went to do with it, which finally wound up with Phil Ogle and myself leading the ‘pack’. He on the Certified Association side, and me from the Chartered side and the two of us generally raised ‘holy hell’ with everybody until we got our way and had the Institute and its Constitution formed. (p.5) 

 

Thus, the 1998/99 ICAJ president, Gordon (2000) noted:

The road to the establishment of the ICAJ was far from smooth, as the parties involved could not arrive at consensus as to how to proceed. The “Certified” group felt that new legislation was necessary, in the form of a Public Accountancy Act to regulate the practice of the profession. Conversely, the members of the Chartered Association were in favour of the English model, which had a special section in the Companies Act to prescribe qualifications for auditors. (p.12)

 

The District Society of Certified Accountants drafted a bill from prototypes of similar legislation in other jurisdictions, and set about lobbying for consensus among the members of the other professional accounting bodies. However, the draft bill met with strong opposition from the members of the “chartered” association, who resolutely held that the local institute should be incorporated under the Companies Act.

          By way of compromise, the former group revised the Draft and submitted it for consideration to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on the eve of Jamaica’s independence in 1962. The Honourable Alfred Rattray, then Assistant Under Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, reviewed the draft, along with similar submissions, which had been invited from the other accounting bodies, in his capacity both as a certified accountant and an attorney-at-law. In his mediation for the group in conflict, Rattray delivered his judgment that:

The Draft submitted by the Certified Accountants group best addressed the Jamaican situation, and in concept, it accorded with the direction being taken by the Ministry. Certain changes were deemed necessary, however, to ensure the livelihood of persons with years of practising experience, who might not have been eligible for membership of a qualifying body.

         Again, on the road for further unification of the profession, conflicts of interest and tension became a renewed tool of negotiation between the practitioners. In the interim between the submission of the Draft Bill and the establishment of the Institute, a Committee was formed of the two main groups of “certified” and “chartered” associations, as the two parties tried to agree on an operational framework for the unification of the profession. As Gordon (2000) observes:

Denis Goldson of Paul Goldson and Company, who laboured over the minutes during the protracted three-year period, concludes that the amount of dialogue was equal only to the paper work, as they drafted the Constitution and Rules twice. The second draft, which was more tailored to the needs of the Jamaican situation, was finally accepted. This formed the basis of the Incorporation & By-Law of the ICAJ, found in Volume 1, Section 1 of the Members’ Handbook (p. 12). 

 

In addition to the formal exchange at the Committee level, there was also ongoing dialogue with the two warring principal bodies and the major audit firms of the day. Whereas there was now consensus on the need to form a local institute, many within the “chartered” group were still not entirely convinced that it should fall under the proposed Public Accountancy Act. However, as the lobby intensified and the barriers of opinion began to crumble, people like William Thwaites of the Chartered Association (the ICAJ’s first president) and James Lord were pivotal to the process of enlisting the support of the capitalist firms, particularly, the members of the “big five[5]”. In 1965, the unincorporated Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica  (ICAJ) was formed. 

         On the formation of the ICAJ, the conflict between the foreign capitalist elite who had dominated the profession before independence with the support of the global capitalist elite, and the local capitalist elite who did not favour any form of foreign domination, continued. In the course of resisting such domination, and partisanship, the local capitalist elites in the Council of the newly formed ICAJ, made nationalist calls on all the ICAJ members that:

If we are Jamaicans foremost in thinking, foreign pressure and partisanship will fall into place. Foreign pressure should not be allowed to destroy our Institute. Present school ties are a dishonourable arrangement, whereby our lovers take us to bed on the understanding that we never marry. (Emphasis added, Minute of ICAJ Meeting, September 1965, p.2 – ICAJ, Archival Records)

            In fact, to put in place the Public Accountancy Act (PAA) that could guide the operations of the proposed ICAJ, again, became a matter of conflict between the local and global capitalist elite groups. While the local capitalist elite wanted the PAA to guarantee professional independence in Jamaica, the global capitalist elite wanted the PAA to continue to defend the status quo.  As the first president of the ICAJ, William Thwaites (1990) further recalled his experience in this regard:

Well, as you know, we have had changes in the Constitution from time to time since then, but I think that even from those days, we had obtained consensus of what we wanted. We have had a certain amount of trouble with getting the Law in the fashion we wanted, and that delayed the thing for quite a while. But certainly, our first Council and “Shadow Council”, if I may put it that way, prior to the actual formation had one consensus and that was that there should be no rift or Divisions between the two sides that were to form and be The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica. (pp.5–6) 

 

         On the formation of the ICAJ in 1965, one of the main objectives was for the new national body to set and mark the Jamaican professional examinations. As an interim arrangement, all parties agreed that the ACCA be allowed to set and mark the ICAJ examinations for a period of three years, after which the ICAJ should take over this responsibility. However, since the formation of the ICAJ, this agreement continues to be the subject of conflict and tension between the two major elite groups in the profession. While the local capitalist elite felt that this objective should be respected and accomplished, the global capitalist elite felt that the foreign nature of the profession as it was during colonization should continue. However, the ambition of the global capitalist elite continues to rule the profession 35 years after Jamaica’s independence. The continued conflicts of interest and tension between the local and global capitalist elites in the profession since its formation in 1965 was re-affirmed by the first president of the ICAJ, who declared that, after 25 years (1965–1990):

There is something that needs sorting out. I feel the Council will be able to sort it out. There has never been a time in the last twenty-five years that you haven’t had some problem or another to solve, but good sense has always prevailed and that’s it. (Emphasis added, William Thwaites in an interview with John Jackson, 1990)

 

           On a regional level, Mendes (1990) observes that the conflicts between the social classes that characterize the Caribbean social history have been responsible for the emergence of elite groups with conflicting interests in the regionalization of the accountancy profession in the Caribbean. These conflicts of interest have militated, and continue to militate, against the achievement of the regional objective in the profession, which was to put in place purely Caribbean examinations. As Ogle  (2000) puts it:

The subject of West Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants (WIICA) was on the agenda of a meeting in Barbados in June 1967. The meeting envisaged that each territorial institute would delegate the function of providing professional examinations to a WIICA. This has not been achieved as yet.

(Emphasis added, paper presented at the conference of ICAJ on training and ethical consideration, February 26, p.7)

 

         The above analyses at the national and regional levels indicate the link between the struggle and class conflict in Jamaica, and Caribbean societies generally, and socio-political and economic development in these societies. This has become more apparent in the post-independence development of the accountancy profession in Jamaica and the Caribbean. This situation reaffirms the observation of Ndubizu (1994), that the study of the socio-political and economic development of any particular society may not be successfully achieved outside of an understanding of the social history that gave rise to the existence of that particular society.

         The conflicts of interests in the Jamaican society, which have been linked to the conflict between the elite groups in the accountancy profession, continue to influence the post-independence development of the profession. Consequently, the post-independence professionalization project and the subsequent formation of the unified national body, the ICAJ, have been influenced by the conflict of identities of the ‘Certified’ and ‘Chartered’ elite members of the ICAJ. This conflict of identity driven professionalization project is examined in the next section.

 

The Professionalization Project and the Formation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ): Negotiation Influenced by the Conflict of Identities of the ‘Certified’ and ‘Chartered’ Elite Members of the ICAJ.

        Before and at independence, the diverse group of accountants and accounting firms operating in Jamaica had formed themselves into three main accounting associations.[6] Some of these newly formed associations, which were satellites of different foreign established professional accountancy bodies, particularly in the UK, employed racial discrimination policies to exclude Jamaicans from becoming members (Rattray, 1962). In addition to this situation, the predicament of prospective Jamaican accountants became compounded by the discriminating attitude of the Jamaican business community and the government in the employment market (Smith, 1962). Consequently, both the government of Jamaica and the Jamaican business community were accused of being guilty of practices that marginalized their own people (Smith, 1962). As Rattray (1963b) opines:

As regards the attitude of business and indeed, of government, the combination of prejudice and ignorance have operated to deprive Jamaicans of their fair share of accountancy practice and experience. It would be interesting to examine the occasions on which the government over the past few years have employed the services of accountants, to note the firms that they have employed and to try to determine why these firms have been employed. (Emphasis added)

 

He further argues:

Another profitable exercise would be to try and find out just who has been assigned by these firms to do the work. I believe that it would become apparent that the main effect of this policy (dictated by ignorance and prejudice) is to deprive Jamaicans of their opportunities in the heart of their own land. (Emphasis added)

 

Thus, Smith (1962) argues:

It would, I think, be difficult to justify taking any drastic action against the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, as a body, in the matter of colour discrimination, when it appears that individual members of government and the business community have in the past been guilty of the same practice. (Emphasis added)

 

The above situation led to the belief that Jamaicans who became qualified in the accountancy profession hesitated to launch out on their own (Salmon, 1998).

       In light of the above, it was agreed to promote “nationalism” in the profession, so as to protect the professional interests of Jamaican accountants. Hence, it was decided that Jamaica should have a “national accountancy law” (the Public Accountancy Act). It was further agreed that the effect of the national accountancy law was to make the Jamaican accountancy profession respond effectively to the socio-political, economic and cultural environment of the island. Moreover, the national accountancy law should also be able to protect the interests of Jamaican accountants and the Jamaican accountancy profession from any global encroachment (see Report of the Committee on a National Accountancy Law, 1963). Particularly, it should make the Jamaican accountancy profession independent of the British-based professional accountancy bodies (Report of the Committee on a National Accountancy Law, 1963). Paradoxically, the national accountancy law, which was finally enacted in 1968, seems to have been conspicuously silent on the above issues, which were said to have been the main reasons behind the enactment of the law (see National Accountancy Law, 1968).

        In fulfilling the above requirements, therefore, the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s committee charged with the responsibility of drafting the national accountancy law, cautioned that:

The Jamaican situation is somewhat different and hence, we were determined to find an appropriate solution, which of course must be different from those adopted elsewhere.  (Emphasis added, Minute Number 43 to the Honourable Minister, Ministry of Trade and Industry, June 11, 1963)

 

Having made these nationalistic commitments, the same committee went further to obtain literature from the USA, UK, and Canada for use as the basis for finding their different solutions. This was done in spite of the earlier warning in the advice given by the same committee to the minister that:

In a small country like Jamaica, there is probably no room for us to operate on the English system unless we are to be satisfied with abandoning the accountancy profession to overseas organizations. The only way to secure a square deal for our nationals and at the same time ensure protection of the public is to have a national accountancy law. (Emphasis added, Minute Number 35, from Committee of Proposed Accountancy Law, to the Honourable Minister, Ministry of Trade and Industry, February 5, 1963)

 

In addition, the committee claimed that the effect of the Public Accountancy Act, 1968 was to create a truly Jamaican profession. Consequent upon this claim, the committee proposed that:

The real answer to the problem is for Jamaica to have its own bodies of professional accountants who would set the examinations hitherto set by the parent bodies in the United Kingdom, and for the Articles to be served in Jamaica. (Emphasis added, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Minute Number 2, to the Permanent Secretary, March 29, 1962)

 

It was, therefore, agreed that the proposal be discussed with the University of the West Indies (UWI), Mona, in order for the university to take up the responsibility for the education of Jamaican accountants. This agreement with the UWI, proposed since 1962, continues to suffer non-implementation. This is due mainly to the criticisms that the minority, but influential, members of the ICAJ, who strongly believe in defending the status quo, continue to level against the proposal, that the UWI is not the appropriate institution to train professional accountants (see Thwaites, 1990). These critics further argue that the UWI and the professional institutions have different missions and yardsticks with which to measure the quality of their products (ICAC, 1998a). Consequently, these critics propose that:

Such proposal of independent examination and credentialing, of Jamaican professional accountants was an impracticable solution in the short and even medium term, and one which would in fact continue for a considerable time, the foreign nature and control of Accountancy profession in Jamaica. (Emphasis added, the proposal of the influential members of the Association of Jamaican accountants, responding to the controversial issue of accountancy independent ambition in Jamaica, 1962)

 

         These critics were not indifferent to the allegation by other people regarding the imperial and racial problems faced by Jamaicans in their association with the established institutes in the island, particularly, those from the mother country. But these members equally shared the view that the solution to the problem of professionalization of accountancy had to be a Jamaican solution. However, they could not offer any solution, such as when and how the profession in Jamaica could become independent. This situation therefore seems to suggest that the proposed national accountancy law, which was also backed by these critics, was to be an instrument to continue to safeguard the international mobility of capital, to the detriment of safeguarding the socio-political and economic interests of Jamaica.

        As a result of these criticisms, a bargain had to be struck between the majority members of the ICAJ who had opted for total professional independence, and the few powerful minority members who had opposed total professional independence.  Consequently, section (ix) of the proposal, which was finally designed and agreed upon to achieve the objectives of the national accountancy law, states that:

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Jamaica would, of course, make provision for articles to be served here in Jamaica and this would be open to all Jamaicans who fulfil the educational requirements and who can arrange for being articled. (Ministry of Trade and Industry Minute Number 43, June 11, 1963)

 

However, section (ix) of Minute Number 43, further clarified that:

As regards examinations, these would in the first three years or so continue to be set by one of the two bodies – the UK bodies of the Association of Certified Accountants and Chartered Accountants –, which would then be not parent bodies but sister, bodies. But it would be expected that in the meantime, arrangements would be worked out for examinations to be set locally, probably under the auspices of the University of the West Indies, or some other examining bodies established for that purpose. It would be expected that the Public Accountancy Law would seek to give effect to these arrangements. (Emphasis added, Ministry of Trade and Industry Minute Number 43, June 11, 1963)

 

Considering these two clarifications, the final draft of the approved and enacted Public Accountancy Law, paradoxically, gives the following effect to such an arrangement:

Any person who passes the prescribed examination held in Jamaica, i.e. the examinations specified by the Professional Accountancy Body incorporated under this Law as being the qualifying examinations for membership in the said professional accountancy body, and who fulfils such other conditions precedent to membership as that body prescribes. (Emphasis added, Part A section (2) sub-section (iv) of the Public Accountancy Law, 1968)

           Thus, the national accountancy law, the main purpose of which was to guarantee the conduct of local examinations, seems to be silent on the matter of conducting local examinations for the purposes of qualifying chartered accountants in Jamaica. Consequently, this clause seems to have effectively empowered the ICAJ, if it deems fit, to seek external examinations and credentialing of future Jamaican accountants (Mendes, 1990). The implication of this development is that the national accountancy law that was enacted to protect the interests of Jamaican accountants seems to have been changed into an act that was incapable of protecting the Jamaican accountants who it sought to protect. The national accountancy law has, in fact, made the Jamaican national body (the ICAJ), which was formed for that purpose, a target for expanding the market of certain foreign accounting professional bodies, particularly, the UK-based ACCA. As a result, the ICAJ, operating with the dominance of a few, powerful and influential minority members, who preferred to continue to defend the status quo, had to start searching for a new accountancy colonizer either temporarily, or permanently.

 

Failure of the Public Accountancy Law to Protect the Interest of the Jamaican Accountants and the Accountancy Profession: ICAJ Searched for a Foreign Parent Body Against its main Objectives

        Out of the three main professional bodies formed in Jamaica before the unification in 1965, the two leading bodies were the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Branch, and the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants Branch, both of the UK. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales[7] on the one hand, is noted for its use of racial and closure policies in its professional activities wherever it operates (Johnson & Cargill, 1971). The Association of Chartered and Corporate Accountants[8], on the other hand, has been a business-oriented body, which emerged with a vigorous overseas policy, oriented to increasing its membership and expanding its organization in such a way as to create a widely based professional empire (Johnson & Cargill, 1971). As Johnson and Cargill (1971) described the two colonial bodies:

“In case of the Institute, the cost and length of obligatory articles in the offices of its Fellows and the severity of its examinations soon became high barriers to entrance. This relative closure of the established profession created conditions for the emergence of new and competing associations catering for those who worked as accountants but were unable to gain admittance to the Institute. While the Institute effectively blocked from entry many who held responsible positions in industry and public practice, the accountancy student and practitioner in the Empire was even more disadvantaged by the Institute’s Charter as articles could only be served with Chartered Accountants in England and only British residents could become Fellows. The Association on the other hand, adopted ‘Imperial’ policy in an effort to attract members, money and influence”

(Emphasis added, p.157). 

These characteristics of the "Institute" and the "Association", as described by Johnson and Cargil, were also demonstrated by the ICAEW, and the ACCA, in their ambitions to become the chosen permanent parent body of the accountancy profession of the island of Jamaica (ICAJ).

         As the Jamaican accountancy profession considered unification, and the main purpose of the National Accountancy Act had been defeated, the next option considered by the Jamaican accountants was to identify one of the overseas professional organizations that could act as a parent body for the proposed ICAJ. However, when the ICAEW and ACCA were approached concerning the decision of the Jamaican government to enact the national accountancy law, the reactions put forward by the two organizations were unacceptable to the Jamaican accountants (Rattray, 1961). In this respect, the committee on Public Accountancy Law complained to the Honourable Minister that:

It will be recalled that the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, had expressed themselves forcibly against the Public Accountancy Law. Whereas, the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants had put forward proposals for such a law. The attitude of the former was of course, reactionary; while the proposals of the latter, although conforming with our objectives, were not acceptable as put forward. (Ministry of Trade and Industry Minute 43, section 5 of June 11, 1963)

 

          Despite the unacceptability of the proposal put forward by the ACCA towards the enactment of the national accountancy law, the ACCA was still favoured over the ICAEW as the likely parent body of the proposed ICAJ. Another advantage that the ACCA had over its rival, the ICAEW, was the issue of professional article-ship. While the ICAEW’s policy in this respect stipulates that article-ship must be served before qualifying, the ACCA allowed article-ship to be served after qualifying. The latter position appeared to be more suitable for the purposes of Jamaican students. As Rattray (1963b) argues:

One point to bear in mind, and I emphasize this, is that there is great ignorance, even among those who one would think ought to know about this question, of accountancy status and qualifications. One used to be led to think that article-ship was the hallmark of proper training. It is now known that it is largely a device for cheap labour, that very little training, if any, over and above purely clerical functions flows from such article-ship and that the real training comes from study and later application. (Emphasis added, Ministry of Trade and Industry Minute Number 21, section 8, from Mr. Alfred Rattray, to the Honourable Minister of Trade and Industry, February 5, 1963)

           The above statement, again, gave the ACCA a higher rating over the ICAEW. In this context, the last statement that seemed to finally guarantee the ACCA’s appointment as the parent body of the ICAJ came when, in the discussion with the local representatives of ICAEW (as part of the Public Accountancy Law Proposal deliberations), the committee on the Public Accountancy Law declared:

It would be extremely unlikely that any government could continue to give recognition to a body that discriminated against its nationals. (Emphasis added, Ministry of Trade and Industry Minute Number 43 section 4, February 5, 1963)

 

Apart from the fact that the ACCA had been able to provide education to about 70% of the qualified accountants in Jamaica at the time of the unification, the above flexible policies were an added advantage in favour of the appointment of the ACCA. As a result, it was finally declared that: 

Based on the available information, many people feel that the arrangements of the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants, which require practice after qualification as a condition precedent to associate membership is much more meaningful than article-ship before the completion of examination followed automatically by professional status. What we have been doing over these years is to deprive our own people of opportunities in the name of a purely illusory concept, which is the result of our own snobbery. (Emphasis added, Committee on Public Accountancy Law Recommendation to the Honourable Minister, Ministry of Trade and Industry, February 5, 1963)

 

           Thus, the Jamaica government and accountants seemed to have decided that the only way forward for the accounting profession was to embrace the UK-based ACCA. The ICAJ therefore chose to become one of the “empire markets” of the ACCA. Moreover, the term of the agreement with the ACCA was not for the ACCA to be the sister body of the ICAJ, as stipulated in the National Accountancy Act, 1968, but for the ACCA to be the parent body of the ICAJ, contrary to the provision in the National Accountancy Act, 1968.

         The UK-based ACCA thus emerged as the popularly identified parent body of the proposed national professional body of accountants in Jamaica (ICAJ).

 

The UK-Based ACCA emerged as the Identified Parent Body of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ)

        Immediately the negotiations for unification had started in the island, negotiations started simultaneously with the ACCA, based on the unanimously agreed proposal put forward earlier by the members of the Jamaica District Society of the ACCA towards the unification of the profession in Jamaica. The proposal states (inter alia) that:

To fill the needs of government, society, commerce and practice suitability, qualified accountants are needed in greater numbers. Training should include expert knowledge of Jamaican financial and mercantile laws and institutions. Qualifying, as accountants by means of training and examinations written in Jamaica are the ones most likely to acquire such knowledge and responsiveness. In due course, examination questions should be framed and students’ answers marked in Jamaica. This should not completely take place until such qualifications granted by a Jamaican examining body can be assured first class status in the eyes of the world. (Emphasis added, Proposal of ACCA Jamaica Branch, to the committee on Public Accountancy Law, August 1, 1962)

 

The requirements and hence, the clarifications went further to specifically state that:

Such an examining body should follow the pattern set by the University College of the West Indies in its progress towards being, as it is today, the University of the West Indies.  (Emphasis added, Proposal of ACCA Jamaica Branch, to the committee on Public Accountancy Law, August 1, 1962)

 

As this proposal had already received the unanimous approval of the Jamaican Branch of the ACCA, it is therefore reasonable to assume that such a proposal may also have received the approval of the parent body (ACCA) in England. Above all, this proposal was quite in agreement with the overall understanding and the unanimous agreement of the entire body of qualified accountants in Jamaica in general, towards the unification of the profession in the country, as contained in the Public Accountancy Law proposal.

          During the unification process, the Jamaican Branch wrote to the ACCA that they had tentatively agreed to merge with the representatives of the Jamaican Branch of the ICAEW. The letter further indicated that there was also some tentative agreement that legislation along the lines of a public accountancy law should be sought after the merger. The letter further emphasized that in the matter of a merger, the present thinking of the District Society’s Committee was to have an Institute of Chartered Accountants in Jamaica which would adopt the code of ethics of the English Institute, and the basis of qualifications of the ACCA including that association’s syllabus. The letter indicated (inter alia) that:

 After these ideas are mutually agreed upon, the ACCA will be asked to set examinations in Jamaica on behalf of the proposed Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica for a number of years. (Emphasis added, Letter of integration of the profession in Jamaica from the Secretary of the ACCA, Jamaican Branch, to the Secretary, ACCA in England, April 11, 1963, AAJ - Archival Records)

 

The letter specifically clarified that: 

During this time, a panel of Examiners in Jamaica would mark the examination papers and the ACCA Examiners in London would review these markings. After a number of years, the Jamaican Institute will set its own examinations. (Emphasis added, Letter of integration of the profession in Jamaica from the Secretary of the ACCA, Jamaican Branch, to the Secretary, ACCA in England, April 11, 1963, AAJ –Archival Records)  

 

            In its initial response to the demands from the proposed ICAJ objectives, the ACCA did not show any sign of disagreement with any part of the proposal. Some ICAJ members interviewed by the researcher for the purpose of this research were of the opinion that any initial disagreement on the part of the ACCA might possibly have denied the ACCA the parent-ship of the proposed ICAJ. However, such a denial could be against the ACCA’s desire of vigorous empire market-driven objectives (Johnson & Cargill, 1971). More importantly, the ACCA did not also show any indication to the negotiating team and individuals from Jamaica that it would not in any way be able to meet the specific demand of the clause dealing with the handing over of the examination and credentialing after a certain mutually agreed period. This period, according to the proposal presented by the ICAJ, and duly accepted by the ACCA, should be between 2 and 3 years. Instead, the ACCA seems to have re-employed its marketing strategies at the initial stage of the negotiation, by showing positive signs of compromise and readiness to do business with the proposed unified Jamaican body, the ICAJ. The ACCA also enthusiastically indicated its readiness to cooperate in all the demands put forward to it by the proposed ICAJ (see report of the meeting between the ACCA secretary, and the executive members of the proposed ICAJ in New York, September 1962 for details). Interestingly, the ACCA even suggested some other areas for further improvements in the contents contained in the public accountancy law proposal presented to it by the ICAJ (see report of the meeting between ACCA Secretary, and the executive members of the proposed ICAJ in New York, September 1962). This particular initial enthusiasm of the ACCA towards the ICAJ’s demands seems to have engendered in the Jamaican negotiators a measure of confidence in their business relationship with the ACCA, that the relationship would be a mutual one.

          However, from the outset, while the Jamaican ACCA qualified accountants (the Jamaican District Society of ACCA) had the belief that they had an autonomous professional body in Jamaica, the ACCA had not at any time been at ease with this independent ambition of the Jamaican branch. In fact, the series of letters which the Jamaican branch had written to the ACCA, using its own letterhead, which seemed to be portraying them as an autonomous body (unknowingly to the Jamaican branch) seems to have posed a threat to the ACCA’s ambition of colonization in the accountancy market in the empire (including Jamaica). As Johnson and Cargill (1971) note:

The desire of the ACCA to have perpetual control of the empire accountancy market in general was an ambition that had actually brought the ACCA to this empire after the Second World War. (p.160)

 

For example, as far back as December 1961, in its ambition to dominate the Caribbean accountancy market for example, the secretary of the ACCA wrote to its branch in Jamaica thus:

I am sure that the Council is extremely anxious that in Jamaica, an acceptable pattern is laid down for the rest of the West Indies. It is moreover, the one place where we are most likely to be able to enforce our wishes because it is only here, from the whole of the Caribbean, that we actually outnumber the members of the various Institutes. The Council has therefore been giving some consideration to the desirability of an official visit from the Association’s officers. Such a visit. I may say, would not be in any way with the intention of interfering with your own legislative activities but rather with the intention of giving such assistance as we can if you desire it. (Emphasis added, letter from the Secretary of ACCA, to Jamaica Branch, December 12, 1961)

 

           In order to remedy this situation, which the ACCA regarded as an oversight on the part of the Jamaican Branch, therefore, the ACCA called the Jamaican branch to order. Thus, in 1963, the ACCA made Jamaica to realize that it was just an enlarged market of the imperial body in England (ACCA) and not an autonomous body, as it had been claiming. As the ACCA letter to the Jamaican branch reads: 

 There has all along been one somewhat curious oversight on your part, namely, that you have always referred to it as ‘the Jamaica District Society’ whereas; it has from its inception been a Branch, which is a slightly superior type of organization. (Emphasis added, ACCA Letter of August 27, 1963, to the Jamaican Branch)

 

However, there was no evidence that the Jamaican accountants reacted to the corrective letter from the ACCA, which therefore suggests that they did not see such a corrective letter as a threat to their aspiration of professional independence. 

          The Jamaican accountants continued to pursue their ambition of professional independence, hence their request to the ACCA, as stipulated in the public accountancy law proposal. In September 1962, four members of the local executive of the proposed ICAJ from Jamaica attended the Eighth International Congress of Accountants held in New York. There, they held discussions with the ACCA representatives. The Jamaican executive officials, again, specifically reiterated their earlier position that:

This scheme as laid down in the proposed Jamaican Public Accountancy Law, would eventually lead to examinations being ‘entirely’ taken over from the Association (ACCA) by a Jamaican body to be formed for that purpose in due course. (Emphasis added, Jamaican Executives to the ACCA Secretary, Mr. F.C. Osbourne, in New York, September 1962)

 

In his response, the secretary of ACCA was of the opinion that:

The Association (ACCA) would be willing to set special examination questions in certain subjects for Jamaican students. Examiners in Jamaica could mark the answer papers. The council would have to approve the examinations. The council would accept Chartered Accountants as examiners, if nominated by the District Society. The marked papers would be reviewed in the United Kingdom. (Emphasis added, Mr. Osbourne, Secretary of ACCA to an ICAJ Executive in a meeting in New York, September 1962)

 

But, Mr. Osbourne seemed to have technically avoided the question of the ‘entire’ examination being taken over by a Jamaican body in any foreseeable future, which was specifically stated in the original proposal and was earlier agreed upon by both parties. As no response was given to this important omission by any of the Jamaican representatives, this non-response seemed to convey the impression that the ICAJ was accepting the new position of the ACCA, which seemed to be contrary to the provisions contained in the Jamaican public accountancy law.

          Again, in July 1963, one of the executive members of the Jamaican branch of the ACCA visited England and held discussions with the ACCA secretary. As this executive again emphasized the Jamaican position on the aspiration for independence, Osbourne responded this time around with a reactionary counter view to his second opinion in New York thus:

As a result of developing countries such as Jamaica, the Association’s (ACCA) sources of membership would be dwindling. He therefore asked the Jamaican executives to consider the possibility of enabling persons sitting the ACCA’s examinations and obtaining the Jamaica qualification automatically being entitled to be members of the Association. (Emphasis added, ACCA, Jamaican Branch, Memorandum of August 6, 1963)

 

Although the Jamaican executive argued that such a third proposal might not be well received and in addition, might generally be misinterpreted by his colleagues in Jamaica, it was this position of the ACCA that was finally accepted in Jamaica, and has been absorbed uncritically, up to the present time.

         In continuation of their negotiations on the issue of the independence of the Jamaican accountancy profession from the ACCA, the Jamaican branch reminded the ACCA in London (in a letter dated March 10, 1964), of its previous request. The Jamaican branch, in the letter, further reminded the ACCA’s secretary of his earlier opinion and commitment in that direction. Specifically, the secretary of the Jamaican branch said he had ment