Being clear about ambiguity
Beverley R. Lord*
Department
of Accountancy, Finance & Information Systems
University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800
Christchurch, New Zealand
Phone: +64-3-364 2620
Fax: +64-3-364 2727
E-mail: B.Lord@afis.canterbury.ac.nz
Stewart Lawrence
Department
of Accounting
University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105
Hamilton, New Zealand
Phone: +64-7-838 4247
Fax: +64-7-838 4332
E-mail: stewartl@mngt.waikato.ac.nz
Acknowledgments: The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions and feedback from Tony Lowe, Jim Haslam, Shanta Davie and participants at the 6th Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, Manchester, July 2000.
Being clear about ambiguity
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the ambiguity associated with change in two New Zealand firms which attempted to introduce TQM. Ambiguity, evidenced in uncertainties, contradictions and confusion, is acknowledged to be an inescapable component of organisational life. The presence and level of ambiguity and reactions to it help to provide an explanation for the failure of the TQM implementation in one case and the lack of accounting change in the other.
Keywords: TQM, ambiguity.
Ambiguity is an inescapable feature of everyday life. Yet the accounting literature is not clear about ambiguity or the implications of ambiguity for accounting practices. There has been some discussion in the literature. March (1987) demonstrates the incompleteness of decision models based on rational economic theory. He makes explicit the implications of recognising ambiguity in decision making and consequently for information provision relating to choice. He argues that theories of choice should include understandings of history, culture and literature. March’s treatment is theoretical and he provides no empirical demonstration of the implications for practice. The social constructivist movement led by Tomkins & Groves (1983) pleads for research into everyday accounting practice including understanding the cultural dimensions of life in organisations. Some researchers have begun to provide empirical examples in which the importance of ambiguity for accounting practice is recognised.
Boland & Pondy (1983) demonstrate that accounting has both rational and natural aspects. Sometimes the rational, objective, quantitative and calculative aspect of accounting is in the foreground while the natural aspect of organisational life is bracketed. Then the rational is bracketed while the qualitative, social and political aspect of organisational life assumes the foreground. According to Boland & Pondy (1983, p. 229):
Because accounting is symbolic not literal, vague not precise, value loaded not value free, dealing with meanings not just things, it tries human beings as moral agents.
In a rejoinder to Boland & Pondy, Meyer (1983) takes the argument to its logical conclusion, pointing out that the rational depiction of organisational life portrayed through accounting procedures is a myth. Yet the myth has a purpose. It is useful. It provides a sense of legitimation to organisational activities. The myth is sustained for its utilitarian value. However, ambiguity is dangerous for utilitarian language, and, as this paper indicates, it is symptomatic of functionalist researchers that they adopt a methodological stance which ignores ambiguity. In response, critical researchers emphasise the conflictual nature of organisational life, and in their own way also downplay the importance of ambiguity.
This paper accepts that people in their daily experience of organisational life exist in a constant state of tension and ambiguity. This tension and ambiguity is illustrated through the use of the literature and through two case studies. The case studies deal with the introduction of a new management technique, Total Quality Management (TQM), and its effect on accounting practice. Though previous studies have referred to ambiguity as an inevitable aspect of accounting practice, there have been few empirical attempts to focus on ambiguity and to identify the sources of ambiguity and their consequences for accounting practices. The purpose of this paper is to begin to fill the void.
A multi-perspectival approach is presented. In a recent theatrical drama written by Lord Archer, “The Accused”, the evidence assembled and presented is ambiguous so that different interpretations and outcomes are possible. In the play, the audience votes and thereby decides which of two endings will be acted out. At least two interpretations of the evidence are feasible. So in research, the interpretation of the evidence may be multiple. As all knowledge is perspectival, anything we know is known as something, it is construed from some point of view (Brown, 1976). Evidence from the field will reflect many points of view. These may be ambiguous and potentially chaotic. To bring order to chaos we as researchers must cast our vote; we choose theories or metaphors to make sense of the evidence. Martin & Meyerson (1988) argue that a multi-perspectival approach to understanding organisational phenomena is needed and argue that it is possible to provide several interpretations, several theorisations, of complex reality.
Meyerson & Martin (1987) and Martin & Meyerson (1988) claim that most organisational researchers look at culture from only one perspective, or paradigm as they call it. The most usual perspective is one that they call "integrative". This perspective defines culture as "that which is shared by and/or unique to a given organization or group" (Meyerson & Martin, 1987, p. 624). Researchers using this perspective often only interview managers and do not spend long in an organisation (Martin & Meyerson, 1988) . In contrast, the "differentiation" paradigm pays "attention to inconsistencies, lack of consensus, and non-leader-centred sources of cultural content. This approach emphasizes the importance of various subunits, including groups and individuals … who represent constituencies based within and outside the organization" (Meyerson & Martin, 1987, p. 630). In their two articles, Martin & Meyerson describe another perspective, the "ambiguity" paradigm, which they say is especially useful during organisational change, as it takes into account ambiguity and confusion. Martin & Meyerson suggest that researchers should use all three perspectives.
This paper looks at TQM implementation, including its effect on management accounting systems. There is a considerable body of published research on this topic, but most of it takes the perspective of Martin & Meyerson's (1988) integration paradigm. There have been some dissenting voices who have tried to present arguments against TQM, which could be classified under the differentiation paradigm. Occasionally, researchers have indirectly mentioned ambiguity in TQM settings (see, for example, Saravanamuthu, 1998). In the next two sub-sections, the literature from the integration and differentiation perspectives is briefly presented. The rest of the paper then presents empirical evidence of ambiguity in two organisations using or attempting to implement TQM.
Although "there is still no universally recognized definition of TQM" (Wilkinson & Witcher, 1993, p. 48), with most authors either avoiding defining the term or listing the attributes of a TQM environment, Feigenbaum's (1991, p. 6) definition of TQM's predecessor, Total Quality Control, seems to include all the elements contained in other authors' lists:
an effective system for integrating the quality-development, quality-maintenance, and quality-improvement efforts of the various groups in an organization so as to enable marketing, engineering, production, and service at the most economical levels which allow for full customer satisfaction.
That is, from an integration perspective, the accepted main elements of TQM are customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, employee involvement and performance measurement.
Several changes to management accounting systems in a TQM environment have been documented. These changes include using non-monetary measures of performance (see, for example, Schonberger, 1989; Morgan, 1990; Turk, 1990; Idstein, 1993; Levine, 1993; Sharman, 1993; Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994; Thorne, Gurd & Southwick, 1994), simplification of reporting (Schonberger, 1989; Vollmann, 1989; Woods, 1989; and Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994; Turney & Anderson, 1989; Hall, 1989), reduced paperwork related to purchasing (Patell, 1987), simplified accounting for work-in-process (Neumann & Jaouen, 1986; Patell, 1987; Schonberger, 1989; Turney & Anderson, 1989; Turk, 1990; Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994; Maskell, 1986), simplified labour recording (Neumann & Jaouen, 1986; Patell, 1987; Turney & Anderson, 1989; Vollmann, 1989; Turk, 1990), changes in bases for allocation of overhead (Neumann & Jaouen, 1986; Turney & Anderson, 1989; Woods, 1989; Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994), classification and measurement of non-value-adding (Carlson & Young, 1993; Sharman, 1993; Turney, 1993) and quality costs (Dahlgaard, Kristensen & Kanji, 1992; Sohal, Ramsay & Samson, 1992; Buehlmann & Stover, 1993; Stanleigh, 1993; Ross, 1994; Brinkman & Appelbaum, 1994), automation of manual accounting procedures (Woods, 1989; Emore & Ness, 1991; Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994), and simplification and continuous improvement of the accounting systems (Neumann & Jaouen, 1986; Vollmann, 1989; Morgan, 1990; Turk, 1990; Walker, 1992; Gerner & McIntire, 1993; Shea & Kleinsorge, 1994).
However, all these studies are from a managerial perspective, without considering that there may be other subunits in the organisations with different viewpoints and agendas. These studies assume that TQM is desirable and unproblematic and that management accounting changes observed should be found in other TQM environments. Also most of these studies are published in professional journals, without any attempt to demonstrate academic rigour in the research process or reporting.
Wilkinson & Witcher (1993, p. 53) note "the absence of discussion about organizational political issues" in the existing TQM literature. They claim that "most of the TQM literature has been written by … general practitioners, mainly consultants [or] specialists from quality and operational backgrounds." These authors have given "optimistic", "prescriptive", "anecdotal" and "partial" accounts with "little questioning of underlying assumptions" (Wilkinson & Witcher, 1993, p. 54). That is, these accounts are viewed through Martin & Meyerson's (1988) integration paradigm.
Martin & Meyerson's (1988) differentiation paradigm enables the researcher to uncover lack of integration, and failure of assumptions promoted in the unquestioning literature. A number of authors have attempted to provide a counterbalance to the integrative reports of TQM implementation. For example, Ezzamel (1994, p. 273) shows how the emphasis on customers is "underpinned by a belief in the supremacy of the market principle", which results in a neglect of the "political dimension of the organization, and ... [a] failure to take adequate account of the costs, economic and otherwise, of market-based controls". Dawson & Webb (1989, p. 236) claim that new production arrangements such as TQM, in their drive for continuous improvement, "serve capital in the search for more efficient exploitation of labour". Wilkinson (1992, p. 326) points out that so-called employee empowerment may be seen "as increasing pressure on employees by getting them to take on more responsibility". Team structures bring pressure from peers to always work at peak capacity and never be absent (Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992) and team work results in more responsibility for team members and leaders without any more rights (Morris & Wilkinson, 1995) or benefits (Wilkinson & Willmott, 1995). Ezzamel (1994, p. 274) too shows that TQM is a "managerialist initiative" without any concern for the effects on the quality of life of the employees. Taking a Foucauldian view, Sewell & Wilkinson (1992) show that the operational performance measures and visual display of TQM enhance the ability of management to increase surveillance and maintain control over the work force.
However, De Cock (1998) warns against taking extreme views, either the extreme views of those promoting TQM or those of critical theorists who claim that TQM "conceals a capitalist schema of alienation, dehumanization, and totalitarianism" (Steingard and Fitzgibbons, 1993, p. 32). The ambiguity paradigm allows a middle position between these two extremes, in which the researcher acknowledges contradictions and lack of consensus without necessarily expecting resolution or corrective action.
March & Olsen (1976, p. 12) define ambiguity as "opaqueness in organizations". Several authors add to this definition by listing characteristics of ambiguity. These can be summarised under the three types of ambiguity identified by Martin & Meyerson (1988): uncertainty, contradiction and confusion.
"Uncertainty refers to a lack of predictability in, for example, the organization's environment or technology" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 112). Uncertainty can also arise because of "inconsistent and ill-defined objectives" (March & Olsen, 1976, p. 12); lack of clarity in "expectations, preferences and evaluation criteria" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 119); unclear, shifting or multiple goals (McCaskey, 1982); vague roles and responsibilities, with changing decision-makers and influence holders (McCaskey, 1982; March & Olsen, 1976); poor understanding of cause-effect relationships and loosely coupled actions and outcomes (McCaskey, 1982; Martin & Meyerson, 1988), making it "hard to see the connections between organizational actions and their consequences" (March & Olsen, 1976, p. 12).
"Contradiction refers to cultural manifestations and interpretations that are capable of double meanings" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988). There may be a paradox because of "inconsistent features, relationships, or demands" (McCaskey, 1982,. p. 5). Ambiguity may arise because the past is "reconstructed or twisted" (March & Olsen, 1976, p. 12). There may be multiple, conflicting interpretations of cultural manifestations (McCaskey, 1982; Martin & Meyerson, 1988), with "differences in interpretation [being] seen as incommensurable, irreconcilable, and unavoidable" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 115). "Inherently irresolvable conflict" (Meyerson & Martin, 1987, p. 625) may result from political or emotional clashes of personal or professional values or from conflicting goals (McCaskey, 1982).
"Confusion is caused by ignorance or lack of information, rather than awareness of contradiction" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988). Participants in events may have difficulty in observing what has happened, or their interpretations may not be able to be transmitted efficiently (March & Olsen, 1976). Individuals may be "ignorant of or indifferent to" other people's viewpoints (Meyerson & Martin, 1987, p. 637). Information may be absent, deficient or unreliable (Meyerson & Martin, 1987; McCaskey, 1982); there may be a lack of time, money, attention and measures of success (McCaskey, 1982).
According to Martin & Meyerson, the three paradigms deal with ambiguity differently. The integration paradigm denies ambiguity (Meyerson & Martin, 1987; Martin & Meyerson, 1988) or recognises it only in the transition from one cultural state to a new one (Meyerson & Martin, 1987). The differentiation paradigm recognises ambiguity only in interaction between subcultures (Martin & Meyerson, 1988). Ambiguity is channelled away, freeing "subcultural members to perceive and respond to only a small part of the complexities and uncertainties of the organization's environment, thus avoiding action paralysis" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 112). The ambiguity paradigm recognises ambiguity. Reactions to it range from revelling in it and legitimating it as a source of innovation creativity, or productive change through to accepting it reluctantly as an inevitable part of life (ibid, p. 113).
Martin & Meyerson (1988, p. 118) claim that "culture research has seldom used an ambiguity-acknowledging perspective". Recently some accounting researchers have mentioned ambiguity in relation to TQM and similar settings. For example, Saravanamuthu (1988, p. 33) demonstrated, from her research in an organisation using TQM and JIT, that "the ambiguous nature of accounting makes it possible to use accounting information politically to meet demands of different interest groups". Although Saravanamuthu (1998) mentions ambiguity at the beginning of her paper, she does not explicitly develop this idea in her subsequent analysis. Thus her work could not be said to be from the ambiguity perspective.
Because of the lack of use of this paradigm, "relatively little is known about the symbolic interpretation of artifacts in cultures portrayed from an ambiguity-acknowledging perspective" (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 118). This paper seeks to redress this imbalance by presenting examples from two manufacturing firms, one of which had changed to TQM and the other which was attempting the change.
The next section briefly describes the two research sites, followed by a description of the research method used. Then examples of ambiguity in the two sites are given. The paper finishes with a discussion of some implications of the findings.
Whiteware started as a family engineering business in the 19th century. During its long history it has manufactured a wide range of products, including iron ranges, locomotives, enamel mugs and candle holders, cast-iron grates, wrought iron fences, lamp-posts and decorative work, baths, handbasins and even grenades and mortar bombs during World War II. Their sole product now is a type of whiteware which is a household name in New Zealand. During the 1960s the family sold their interest in the business, and the firm went through several owners and company structures until they were wholly taken over by a large Australian whiteware firm in the late 1980s.
Employees who were there at that time describe the factory as "a Dickensian workshop – monochrome, dingy, dark",[1] "a real shambles – higgledy, piggledy". Seeing the potential for turning around a loss-making business, the new owners employed a plant manager, Peter, who had had many years of experience with TQM in five other firms, including Toyota. His brief was to implement TQM at Whiteware.
By the time this research was carried out, three years later, the factory had been transformed. A kanban system was in use, which operated not only within the factory but also included most suppliers. The factory had been divided into teams, and each of the teams met regularly to decide on and carry out improvement projects. One of the local universities brought students through the factory each year to see a "textbook example" of TQM in practice.
Three months after the last contact with Whiteware, one of the authors received a phone call from Peter, the plant manager. He said that he was leaving Whiteware, as he had been hired by a smaller company, Doorways, expressly to implement TQM. This firm was started in the late 1980s, and had been managed until this time by the founder and owner, Donald. However, Donald recognised that his strengths were in marketing, and looked around for someone with experience in factory management to increase production. The firm is not dissimilar to Whiteware, in that it manufactures essentially one product, the major proportion of the production process consists of pressing parts out of steel, plus some electronics and assembly. Doorways is much smaller than Whiteware, with about 35 employees compared with Whiteware's 150 employees.
Research commenced at Doorways during Peter's first week there. He gradually introduced elements of TQM, using Whiteware as the model. All the employees of Doorways were taken to see TQM in practice at Whiteware. Process improvement teams were formed a month before Peter commenced work there. Many of the visible reporting systems from Whiteware were reproduced for Doorways, such as boards displaying skills of team members, and whiteboards for recording production, continuous improvement, defects, etc. Kanban was gradually introduced. However, Peter abandoned the attempt to implement TQM and left Doorways after seven months.
An ethnographic approach was used, employing various data gathering techniques, including formal and informal interviews of managers and employees, and observation in the factories and at many types of meeting. The researcher visited each site weekly for four months, and also visited at other times to observe various meetings. There were also opportunities to chat informally to people, for example, at drinks after work, at social events, and sitting in the staff cafeteria at meal breaks. Evidence from these contacts was supplemented by other contextual documentary material, such as newspaper and journal articles, company newsletters, process improvement team minutes, and internal financial reports.
The reactions of employees at Doorways indicated uncertainty about the likelihood of success for TQM. The following comments were typical:
Well, people are likely to be a wee bit dubious about these changes. It's been suggested before, and they will probably take a wait-and-see attitude.
I think people in the factory have a 'wait and see' attitude — they're wondering if it's just the latest fad.
A year and a half ago we started a kanban system, but it faded out. They probably think it might just be talk this time too.
It was notable that the comments always implied that these uncertain feelings were other people's opinions.
There was also uncertainty at Doorways over how long the planned change to TQM should take. Peter's expectations were that it should be happening much quicker than it was. For example, he held one overall training session with the whole work force and took them all to Whiteware to see TQM actually in practice. Then he held a training course for the process improvement team leaders. He expressed surprise at the slowness of reaction from the employees, saying, "I've done training courses with them. Why aren't they doing it now?" After the third process improvement team leaders' meeting, Peter commented on the fact that one of the team leaders had only just realised at that meeting that he was going about things the wrong way: instead of tackling one problem and being able to set targets and see them achieved, he had had a long list, none of which was getting done. Peter's impatience may have been because of his experience with many TQM implementations: he knew already what he wanted done and what to expect. However, it was surprising that, given his extensive experience, he did not realise that people need to be shown things more than once, need to be praised for what they have grasped, need to be guided in selecting manageable projects, etc., all of which take more than a few months to operationalise.
Many of the process improvement teams at Doorways were unclear about their aims. Instead of choosing one project at a time, that the team would be able to achieve, they made a lot of suggestions for other people to carry out. For example, a member of one team said:
We have trouble thinking of changes to make in
[our area]. We can't think of anything
of importance. We do have suggestions
to make for outside [our area]. Most of
[our team members] have considerable experience in other manufacturing firms,
and can see things that would help in other areas of the factory. We must get around to suggesting them.
There were vague roles in the team leaders' meetings, in the process improvement teams and regarding responsibility for making improvement suggestion; all these uncertainties being symptoms of ambiguity.
Half an hour after work began each day at both factories, there was a meeting of the plant manager and all the team leaders. At this meeting the plant manager told team leaders anything important for smooth production that day, such as planned production numbers for each model, any shortages, and problems which might affect production in various departments. Each team leader reported on problems in their departments which could affect others, such as staff absent and faults that would affect the next department in the process. Anyone could offer suggestions on how to overcome the problems so that production could proceed as planned if at all possible.
One of the people present at the team leaders' meeting at Doorways was uncertain about her role in the meeting:
Sometimes I wonder if I should be there, because I just give them information that they can get anyway. For example, I give them [certain information each day], but I don't know why I am doing this! Other times I hear things that it's great that I know about.
At Whiteware there are daily, five minute team meetings where the team leader shares with the team the information gained at the early morning team leaders' meeting. Although these meetings had been held for several years, there was still a lack of two-way communication. They were supposed to be a forum for suggestions from the team members as well as the place for team leaders to convey information from their morning meeting. However, in practice, usually the leader did all the talking. When people did contribute, it was usually just to call out comments or to ask questions. One team leader said, "They're in a hurry to get to smoko!" Another said:
To begin with the employees were embarrassed. Even now there is not much feedback during that time. They are more inclined to give me feedback as I go around, and I can identify possible pressure areas.
Thus there was ambiguity for team members about what was expected of them in these meetings.
All workers at Doorways were formed into process improvement teams before Peter even started working there. However, there were a number of ambiguities about the teams.
There was uncertainty about which team some of the employees should join. For example, at the beginning there was one team which consisted of employees that did not fit easily into a team associated with a part of the factory, such as press shop, assembly or stores, as their jobs took them into several areas. As these team members had nothing in common except their multi-disciplinary jobs, they found it difficult to think of improvement suggestions and there was no rapport between them. Later this team was disbanded and the members joined other teams.
The teams were vague about their role in the improvement process. One team thought their aim was to find things to change, but not necessarily for them to change. Another team thought that the team meetings were an opportunity to get in writing and up on the notice board the things that they were worried about. Therefore they suggested improvements for other teams.
The employees were also uncertain about the authority of their teams to make and carry out suggestions. In one team, they had previously identified a safety problem. The team discussed what they had done to solve it: they had mentioned it several times to one of the managers. Someone suggested that they go straight to Peter, giving the impression that they thought that if they mentioned it to someone like the manager of their area it would get put off, or that person would make some excuse why it could not be fixed, while if they went straight to Peter it would get done straight away. Thus there was ambiguity because of uncertainty about roles and authority: who was responsible for making changes.
Some of the teams had trouble thinking of anything to change, and Peter ended up telling them what they should work on, instead of the suggestion and solution coming from the team. With another team, Peter changed their aim to one which he thought was better. This created ambiguity over the roles and responsibilities of the process improvement teams: were they really empowered, or were they just a means by which Peter could achieve his aims?
Although there had been more than 500
suggestions for improvement in the first three years of TQM at Whiteware, there
was ambiguity over their source. The
TQM literature promotes continuous improvement as part of employee
empowerment. However, although there
were regular process improvement team meetings, and the suggestions were
supposed to have come from the shop floor, one of the team leaders admitted
that most suggestions actually came from the team leaders.
There was also ambiguity present in team meetings because of uncertainty over the role of each team member. In each meeting the team members took turns at being chairperson. However, that meant that the chairperson was inexperienced (as it was a different person each time). Also the role of the team leader was then uncertain: should they sit back and let the chairperson control the meeting, or should they make sure that the meeting kept on track and covered achievable goals? In one team meeting the researcher attended, she could not work out who the chairperson was: the team leader led all the discussion. The person who had been chairperson the previous week said that that was usual – the week before he had "only got about six words in".
One of the first changes at Doorways was the installation of "Continuous Improvement" (CI) whiteboards beside each machine. Every half hour the worker using that machine was supposed to check the last item worked on and tick the board if the quality was all right. "Ticking every half hour on the CI boards is ... visual — anyone can see as they are walking past that things are going okay." However, in the press shop there was uncertainty to begin with over roles. It was not the operators who checked the quality: every half hour the operators put one part in the green bin beside the machine, and the production manager came to check them.
Meyerson & Martin (1987, p. 635) link the concept of loose-coupling to the differentiation paradigm:
Differentiation channels attention so that a single organizational subunit enacts and responds to a small portion of an organization's overall environment. Channelling attention in this manner links subunits more tightly to their immediate environments, yet perhaps more loosely to each other ... Thus, subcultures in differentiated organizations are often loosely coupled to each other. Loose coupling can buffer the effects of sub-units' responses, encouraging localized adaptation and experimentation ... Loose coupling dampens the flow of information within an organization across subunits.
However, they also suggest that "loosely coupled actions and outcomes" are a source of ambiguity (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p. 119).
Loose coupling was evident in the process improvement teams at Doorways. For example, one team that quickly applied all the ideas suggested by Peter had little effect on other parts of the factory. All the workers in this team had re-trained so they could do each of the jobs of the other team members. They also recorded and displayed multi-skill levels, their planned and actual production, continuous improvements they had made and their worst defects. However, although their adoption of TQM elements was published on the notice board and talked about at team leaders' meetings, the application of this team had no effect on other teams.
Despite cellular manufacturing being introduced in one part of the factory as a result of a employee’s suggestion, other parts of the factory were unaffected. The presses at Doorways were illogically placed: two recently purchased computerised presses were at the opposite end of the building from the press shop. One of the press operators noted:
There's quite a bit of time lost by having the CNC presses right down the other end of the factory. Some things have to be first done down this end, and then they have to wait for a fork-lift to be available, which could be up to 5-10 minutes, and then it's transported down the other end to have some more work done on it, and then it comes back down here to be riveted.
Despite the observation and implications, no remedial action occurred.
Use, or rather non-use, of notice boards was another indication of loose-coupling. At Doorways there were symbols of increased communication between management and workers. There were more meetings in which employees had a say, and the minutes of these were displayed on a notice board so everyone could read about what other teams were doing. However, no one seemed to have ever read the minutes of other teams, so the employees were not taking advantage of this means of inter-team communication. This was another symptom of the loose-coupling.
The use of symbols and metaphors is a characteristic of ambiguous environments (McCaskey, 1982). Cohen (1974, p. 23) notes that symbols themselves are ambiguous: "symbols are objects, acts, relationships or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and impel men to action".
In implementing TQM Peter used symbols and metaphors a lot, but often people's reactions to and comments about the symbols indicated that ambiguous messages were being given and received. Some examples of these paradoxes and conflicting messages are given below.
One of the elements of TQM, employee empowerment, implies a levelling of the hierarchy. Peter used a number of symbols of this lack of hierarchy.
At Whiteware the breakdown of the distinction between "upper" management and the workers was symbolised by the venue for meetings: daily team leader meetings are held every morning in the board room. A former employee of Whiteware said that before TQM, "The factory staff and the office staff never really saw each other." Now the factory team leaders are in and out of the office daily. They also prepare their own reports on the computers and photocopier in the office. Peter also symbolised the breakdown of traditional management hierarchy at Whiteware by managing "by wandering around" (Peters & Waterman, 1982). He was often seen in the factory, and employees were able to talk with him directly without having to go up through any hierarchical channels.
He continued this habit at Doorways, and made a point of being in the cafeteria at breaks and lunch times when all the factory staff were there. He also impressed staff by spending the first week working alongside them in each department, to familiarise himself with the various processes. During that week he wore jeans like everyone else. At meetings he also displayed symbols of being on the same level as other people. For example, he did not sit at the head of the table, and he often sat in a relaxed posture with his foot up on a chair.
However, there were contradictions between the symbols of no hierarchy used by Peter and the way some of his other behaviours were read by employees. It was evident from the way that workers at Doorways talked about "management" that they still perceived a hierarchy of power:
Sometimes management have tended to act as though the people at the coal face are dumb, and they're not.
This machine isn't set quite right so some of the holes aren't coming in quite at the right angle. I've mentioned that already, about the time Peter arrived, and management said, "Yes, we'll do something about it" but they haven't got round to it yet and I'm having to make some more now to go into the container and they're going to be sent out not quite right.
We asked a while ago for a ventilator extractor fan. "Management" has done nothing.
Peter also organised more selective groups for social occasions, such as drinks on Fridays with team leaders. One year Peter held a "Hat Party" at his home to which he invited people that he had found particularly helpful and supportive from several firms in which he had worked. At a later process improvement team meeting, one of the items on the agenda was that they were still unhappy about the “them and us” feeling with management because not everyone was invited to the Hat Party.
There was ambiguity in the reasons for Peter making the move from Whiteware to Doorways. The owner of Doorways wanted Peter to increase production. Someone said that the need for increased production was to legitimise and help pay for two very expensive computerised presses that had been purchased. Peter, however, focused on quality, and immediately put into place processes to ensure a quality product. Thus there was ambiguity because of conflicting goals.
There were contradictions in the way that Peter projected himself and was perceived at both firms. Although he used symbols of equality (such as dressing in jeans and working alongside employees, not sitting at the head of the table at team leaders' meetings and eating in the cafeteria), his manner of making sure work was done was autocratic ("Peter wouldn't let us do TQM unless we did it his way") and "bossy".
On arrival at Whiteware, Peter organised immediate changes in the appearance of the factory, to symbolise the complete changes that would come as a result of TQM. These changes in appearance included painting all the machines, both to brighten up the factory's appearance and also to make all the machines a uniform colour. However, in order to "get it looking good quickly at the beginning", the machines were not stripped down and painted carefully: the painters, using enamel paint, painted over bolts and labels. Bolts were not greased before painting, so could not be undone after painting. More importantly, safety instruction labels were also painted over. Thus, the message of positive change (symbolised by bright colours) conflicted with the disregard of operator safety.
Also, the use of symbols was two way. At Whiteware, where TQM was well established, some employees had their own symbols — of resistance to change. For example, some areas of the factory are still called by their old names (e.g., "B" shop for the press shop) even though no-one can remember why the names were given in the first place. These conflicting symbols existed alongside each other.
There was also conflict between accounting personnel and the plant manager at Whiteware. The financial controller and the plant manager were openly in conflict with each other. For example, when the plant manager claimed that inventory levels had dropped because of kanban, the financial controller was quick to provide figures that showed that the value of inventory had in fact risen. The plant manager pointed out that production had increased, and that inventory levels were smaller in proportion to production, even if larger in value.
The plant manager at Whiteware wanted simpler, visual reports, rather than the multi-paged financial report provided by the accountant. The accountant, on the other hand, seemed proud of his "extensive report each month", showing the researcher what was included in it and letting her see a copy. He satisfied the request of the plant manager by simply adding a page of graphs to the front of the written report. However, the plant manager claimed that they seldom looked at the pages of financial reporting in the business team meetings. Thus their conflicting interpretations of what was most important existed alongside each other.
The accountant at Whiteware believed that his job was to "be the conscience of the organisation", and he claimed to provide true accounting figures without "smoothing" of expenses. The plant manager, on the other hand, showed by his emphasis on non-financial performance measures that he considered the accounting figures not to be that useful. That this difference of opinion was irreconcilable was evident. Statistical measures and other performance measures were not recorded and used by the accountant, but existed alongside the traditional management accounting system and were used by the plant manager and the team leaders.
The financial controller introduced a non-value-adding activity, which conflicts with the aims of TQM. He claimed that there is less ability to track inventory with the kanban system. With raw materials being in the millions of dollars range, there could be large discrepancies between raw materials input and valuation of finished goods inventory. Therefore he instituted a physical count of inventory every six months in order to keep more control.
The senior accounting clerk, who has been
employed at Whiteware for more than 30 years, spent a quarter of her time
recording overseas transactions manually in a multi-columned cash book. She was resisting suggestions that the cash
book be computerised, citing the regular need to be able "to look back and
find any particular information".
Of course, searching would be quicker with a computerised system. However, the resistance showed her inner
conflict between the old system which she was comfortable with and had invested
her own effort in developing and a new system, no matter whether it was better
or not.
The accountant and the senior accounts clerk, both of whom had worked at Whiteware for more than 20 years, had developed an historical display of all the types of products the firm had produced since its inception in the 19th century. This could be read as a symbol of their attachment to the past, along with the above examples of resistance to change.
One team at Doorways immediately took up
the idea of multi-skilling – everyone trained so they could operate everything
in the room, and they continually rotated jobs. However, all the other teams had all sorts of excuses why they
could not multi-skill. These groups had
goals which conflicted with Peter's goals: their goals were to make sure that
they kept up with their own work, whereas Peter's goal was to have several
workers who could do the same job, so that if the person who usually performed
a particular task was away or very busy, other people could step in and help.
The owner of Doorways (Donald) and the manager he employed (Peter) had conflicting management styles. Donald did not give even his managers much autonomy to make their own decisions. Decisions had to be "checked" with him. One of the elements of TQM which Peter was trying to introduce was employee empowerment: employees making and carrying out suggestions for improvement and employees being able to decide whether or not to stop production so that faults could be corrected and avoided. Peter said, "The aim of TQM is: don't tell them everything they should do — let them see the sort of thing and let them learn by making mistakes and then learning ways of continuous improvement." Donald, on the other hand, tried to find someone to blame and punish if anything went wrong. There was ambiguity because of these conflicting styles: employees were uncertain whether to take Peter at his word and try out new things because they were afraid that Donald would find out that they had done something wrong and "punish" them for it.
There were, however, conflicting opinions
about Donald. Some managers said that
he was often not on the site or too busy to meet with managers. He was criticised for over-estimating demand
and under-estimating lead-times for design and development of new
products. There was also a story in the
factory about lax safety procedures leading to two employees losing
fingers. On the other hand, one manager
said that Donald was a really good man to work for. "He knows what he's doing.
He's really good at marketing.
The company is where it is today because of him."
Another core element of TQM is involvement of employees. Although employee involvement was officially espoused at Doorways, there were examples of employees being left out of decisions. For example, new rubbish tins were provided, painted in the firm's colours. However, they were much too small for many areas of the factory, where only a couple of pieces of scrap filled them. One employee thought that this showed a lack of communication: "I would have though Peter would have talked to people on the shop floor about them before implementing them. The [much bigger] bins we've used in the past would have been better. They could have been painted up and made to look neat and tidy." Thus this symbol was interpreted negatively: as a symbol of lack of communication.
One of the employees at Doorways made the
suggestion that vacancies be advertised internally. This employee said that people were disgruntled that when jobs
came up within the factory, particular individuals were asked if they would
like to move into that area, without anyone else knowing about it. He asked if they could advertise internally
when a job came up, so that people could express their interest. Otherwise management might not have noticed
someone who would be able to do the job, and might not know that others wanted
to be considered. This suggestion was
taken up by Peter: the next vacancy was advertised and several people
applied. However, when the successful
applicant was named and appointed, there were conflicting interpretations of the
decision. The rumour went around that
management had advertised the job to appear as if they were making it available
to anyone qualified, but that they had already decided who was to have it.
There was a similar reaction when Peter tried to introduce a new employment contract with compensation for competency and skill levels. Because there is no union representative at the firm, a team of workers formed to act as negotiators on behalf of the workers. Peter considered that he was "going very slowly and carefully with them", recognising that they had no experience in negotiating. The negotiating team, however, thought they were "being rushed into making a decision … We were told about it yesterday and are expected to have it all settled by tomorrow, which I think is a bit rushed."
Peter claimed that
the representatives elected by the work force were inexperienced in negotiation. They only had the confrontation style that Union representatives used to take and TV programmes as their models. They didn't have an understanding of bargaining. … The employees came with a long "wish list". I got [the accountant] to cost it out, and if all the employee demands had been met it would have cost the firm $400 000. I was prepared to meet some of the demands and concede on some issues.
However, from the negotiators' point of view: "People had a chance to air their views and express their concerns. But I think management took our list away, read it, and then basically went ahead and did what they said they were going to do before they met with the employees." Thus there were conflicting interpretations of the negotiations and their results.
There were also examples of confusion at Doorways because of lack of information, time and money.
From his first week at Doorways, Peter
started a meeting every morning with the team leaders. Team leaders commented that they were
enjoying finding out about each other's departments and how delays and events
in other departments were affecting production. However, this information did not go further. Unlike at Whiteware, where the information
from the early morning meeting was shared with all the workers at five-minute
meetings before morning tea, the team leaders at Doorways were not passing on
the information. One team leader even
said he wondered whether it was the sort of information they should be giving
their workers. The team leaders were
not certain about their responsibilities regarding the information they
obtained in that meeting, which could also have lead to confusion among the workers
because they lacked information about delays and the effects of other departments
on their own work.
When the press shop operators at Doorways
eventually changed to operator assessment, the operators had problems
determining what was good quality. As
the team leader in the press shop said: "A lot of them are stopping every
half hour, but they don't know yet what they are checking for. There are so many variables in the making of
one part. We need to define the
critical areas, and get them to check those." Thus, there was ambiguity because of lack of information. (After three months a new board appeared in
the press shop. On it were samples of
some of the parts made in that area, some labelled "good", others
"poor". Those labelled
"poor" had comments underneath them saying what was wrong with them
and what points to note when making them.
Other areas of the factory had samples or drawings to indicate what was
and what was not good quality.)
As mentioned earlier, there appeared to be some confusion between Peter and the team leaders at Doorways over the speed of the TQM introduction, with Peter considering that there was a lack of time and a need for fast change, whereas team leaders wanted to let the process take as long as it needed to. One of the team leaders who enthusiastically embraced and implemented the changes suggested said: "Peter will need to go slow. It will take time to implement changes." Another team leader complained about lack of time, saying that the improvement meetings were too frequent, as problems could not be solved in one week, and then in the next week's meeting more problems were suggested so that the list kept growing.
Some of the teams had made suggestions but were unable to carry them out because of lack of money. For example, one team decided they needed lights above their work benches. On being told that there was not enough cash, they made their own out of available parts in their work area, but found that they were not bright enough. The idea had to be put on hold pending cash being available.
The three paradigms differ in their treatment of ambiguity. The integration paradigm pretends that ambiguity does not exist, by denying it and taking no action. The differentiation paradigm recognises the existence of ambiguity but channels it so that only a small part of the organisation has to deal with it.
The ambiguity paradigm, on the other hand, does not view ambiguity as "some sort of personal failure of understanding or skill" but as "a rich, if frustrating, and inevitable part of life" (McCaskey, 1982, p. 6). Although authors such as March & Olsen (1976) and Weick (1982, 1985) have embraced the idea that there is inevitably ambiguity present in organisations, especially during times of change, these authors imply that ambiguity can be resolved: "people who can resolve it gain power" (Weick, 1985, p. 125)
Other authors, on the other hand, claim that ambiguity may be accepted (Martin & Meyerson, 1988) but is not necessarily resolved: "patterns tend to develop, but this is by no means a unitary top-down view of control. … Action moves frequently from integrated to differentiated control, sometimes without directional intentionality, and sometimes with it. … Tensions are thus sustained in interminable ambiguity" (Golding, 1991, p. 582).
Meyerson & Martin (1987, p. 638) use a metaphor of a web when applying the ambiguity paradigm: "Individuals are nodes in the web, temporarily connected by shared concerns to some but not all the surrounding nodes. When a particular issue becomes salient, one pattern of connections becomes relevant. That pattern would include a unique array of agreements, disagreements, pockets of ignorance, and hypocrisy. A different issue would draw attention to a different pattern of connections." This could be seen in the different web of relationships in, for example, the employment negotiations compared with the improvement team meetings at Doorways. It was also evident on an individual level: the person who suggested cellular manufacturing, which was aligned with management's aims, was also vociferously anti-management in employment contract negotiations.
The presence of ambiguity in Doorways helps to explain why Peter was unsuccessful in implementing TQM there. The loose coupling prevented teams from learning from each other. Uncertainty, contradictions and confusion prevented the unified culture that Peter was trying to introduce from developing. Many symbols were read differently than they were intended. Multiple and vague goals and roles meant that organisational members were pulling in different directions and motivated by different values. The unexpected result of the ambiguity was a rejection of TQM and what it stood for in people's minds.
Boland (1989, p. 598) suggests that accounting has a role in shaping organisational reality:
the accounting system is at work celebrating economic rationality, confirming privileges of rank, reflecting structures of authority and embodying our dreams of efficiency and purposeful coherence. … It makes available a common legitimized vocabulary of economic calculations, it sequences moments of management planning and review and it provides a common version of organizational history.
TQM may focus on other ways of identifying significant events and themes, and provide different structures of authority. This may be a reason why accountants would resist change, because they might find that their place in the authority system is being threatened. As has been mentioned before, both the accountant and the senior accounts clerk at Whiteware resisted substantive changes to accounting and the systems that they had developed.
Emore & Ness (1991, p. 44) suggest that
"one potential explanation for the lukewarm interest in adopting new cost
accounting practices is the fear of upsetting the systems on which companies
depend for financial accounting information. ... managers are reluctant to
implement broad cost accounting changes unless reconciliation with the general
ledger can be assured." This
conflict between management accounting and financial accounting goals was
present at Whiteware. The accountant
spent a large proportion of his time on financial accounting and taxation
accounting, and his concern with accurate inventory valuation was also
financial accounting related.
One of the reported changes to accounting
in JIT environments is reduced tracking of inventory. Foster & Horngren
(1988) suggest amalgamating Raw Materials and Work in Process accounts, and
only recording ("backflushing") costs at one or two points in
production. However, Calvasina,
Calvasina & Calvasina (1989, p. 45) warn that only backflushing costs when
goods are finished may result in the necessity for physical counting of
inventory, which "contradicts one of the basic objectives of the JIT
philosophy – the elimination of wasteful nonvalue-adding functions." This conflict was present at Whiteware:
because of the reduction in trigger points for backflushing, the
non-value-adding activity of physical counting had been instituted.
Although changes to new accounting methods,
such as ABC, non-value-added costs and quality costing, have been documented in
firms implementing TQM, it is disputable whether they need to be
introduced. For example, non-financial
performance measures and tracking of trends can enable the identification and
reduction in non-value-adding costs without further classification and tracing
of costs. Thus there is ambiguity about
the necessity for changes to accounting.
Watson (1994, p. 896) describes the
ambiguous situation faced by managers trying to implement new management techniques
such as TQM: they "are trying to exert control simultaneously on behalf of
the employing organization and over their own lives by using these ideas and
actions to make sense of their own lives
and their place in the scheme of things". Managers such as Peter need to be successful in implementing TQM,
as their success defines their role of manager. For example, Peter was employed by both Whiteware and Doorways
because of his reputation for successfully implementing TQM in other
organisations. Therefore, he had
personal reasons for wanting TQM to be successful in these firms as well as the
stated aims of allowing employee empowerment, providing better work conditions
for employees, and other claims of TQM gurus.
Thus there was ambiguity over his goals as the change agent.
The integration paradigm is a "top down" perspective: looking from a managerial point of view, it seeks support for the thesis that TQM involves a focus on customers, continuous improvement of products and processes, employee involvement and management commitment. This paradigm has underlying assumptions of harmony of interests, consensus as to goals, and a unitary culture. Researchers taking the integrative view of organisations are looking for regularities and support for theoretical positions.
A TQM endeavour would be judged "successful" if managerial aims have been met, that is, if quality has been improved through incorporating the above elements of TQM. Because a unitary culture is assumed, any signs of conflict would be interpreted as "dysfunctional" and contrary to TQM. Thus attempts would be made to eliminate conflict. The inevitable existence of ambiguity is ignored or denied.
The differentiation paradigm is the antithesis of the integration paradigm, looking at organisations from labour's point of view. Using this perspective, conflict with and lack of consensus about the above expected characteristics of TQM and accounting are seen. This paradigm assumes conflict of interest between labour and management, and between sub-cultures and the main culture. From a critical viewpoint, TQM is seen as exploiting the work force. Those using the differentiation view, as well as looking for conflict and lack of consensus, are "interested in changing organizational practices either to improve efficiency or out of an interest in emancipation" (Lawrence & Phillips, 1998, p. 158).
Because TQM characteristics are seen as ways of increasing profit at the expense of labour, from the differentiation point of view no TQM initiative would be called "successful", unless it were truly emancipatory, including, for example, some form of profit sharing. From the differentiation perspective, conflict is highlighted in an attempt to effect change, and changes that do occur are not always the changes that management expect when they introduce a change initiative such as TQM.
The ambiguity paradigm is a synthesis of the other two paradigms: it looks at organisations from both management's and labour's perspectives. The simultaneous existence of both consensus and lack of consensus, of regulation and conflict, of clarity and lack of clarity result in ambiguity.
This paradigm accepts that ambiguity is always present. As different people react differently to the presence of ambiguity, the ambiguity perspective explains why some organisations successfully implement TQM (that is, develop the characteristics of TQM), while others do not. The presence of ambiguity helps to explain why sometimes management achieve their objectives, while in other cases outcomes are not always as intended. The ambiguity perspective also helps explain why accounting systems change in some TQM environments but not in others, and why some people support organisational change while others resist it.
Research from the ambiguity perspective does not attempt to eliminate conflict, nor is it trying to effect change. Using this perspective, this paper has sought to uncover "the unintended, self-defeating consequences of striving to impose purpose and design upon inescapably indeterminate processes of organization" (Willmott, 1992, p. 58). The paper has described and tried to provide understanding, but does not attempt "to say why one particular social arrangement is better than any other" (Lawrence & Phillips, 1998, p. 157). Rather it highlights the inevitable and continual presence of ambiguity as interesting in its own right.
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